



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 February 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Richard Kennedy
NSC Staff

SUBJECT : Papers Requested by Dr. Kissinger

Attached are four sets of documents requested by Dr. Kissinger to be relayed to him.

A. One copy of a personal message to him from me which he asked me to send during the course of a telephone conversation Tuesday evening.

B. Three copies of the memorandum on Hanoi's intentions requested at the 6 February WSAG. [redacted]

25X1

C. Three copies of the memo on force deployments which was requested at WSAG. [redacted]

25X1

D. Three copies of the note on infiltration whose substance was incorporated in the annex to the DCI's WSAG brief (which I gave you) but which I asked be done up as a separate memorandum. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

Attachments filed
WAC

Eric Chono
VAS Chono

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800040047-5

25X1

9 FEB 1973

PLEASE RELAY THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE TO DR. KISSINGER:

1. After musing on our 6 February telephone conversation and taking counsel with some of my colleagues, I offer the following views, which my colleagues also share, on why the DRV leadership wanted to have you come to Hanoi.
2. The Politburo's motives probably cover a fairly broad spectrum, ranging from simple human curiosity to more elaborate and arcane raisons d'etat. I would not be at all surprised if Le Duc Tho wanted to show you off (perhaps thus providing proof for some of the tales he has been relating). I also suspect that his Hanoi associates have a genuine desire to see you for themselves, at close range and in the flesh.
3. On a larger, less personal scale, Hanoi's objectives lie much more in the realm of symbolism and atmospherics than concrete content or immediate substance. The North Vietnamese probably think they have a better chance of nailing down questions of postwar political and economic relations with the U.S. by talking directly with you, but symbolic and atmospheric considerations (not efficiency or ease) would have shaped their preference for Hanoi as the site for these discussions.
4. When you and President Nixon visited Peking, I am sure your hosts were exquisitely courteous. I am equally sure that they knew full well

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800040047-5

SECRET

25X1

SECRET/ []
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800040047-5

that -- no matter what was actually said or done during your visit -- this visit would be instantly and instinctively construed by Chinese (of all political persuasions) throughout the world as barbarian chiefs coming to pay tribute to the celestial emperor at the seat of civilization -- which, to most Chinese, is the right and proper thing for barbarians to do when the stars are running on their true courses and the universe aligned in proper order. Hanoi's rulers will be playing similar themes, at least in a muted minor key. No matter to what extent your hosts honor their pre-visit promises regarding minimum publicity, you had better be resigned to the fact that they will play your visit -- at least to Vietnamese audiences, who will be predisposed to read the symbols in this fashion anyway -- as proof of Hanoi's "victory" which you have come to acknowledge. Be equally assured that any aid agreements which emanate from your visit (or can be made to look as if they did) will be at least internally advertised as "reparations" or a defeated enemy's "tribute".

5. Another plus for your visit, in Hanoi's eyes, is that it is bound to irritate Saigon and fan the paranoid suspicions for which our allies -- like virtually all Vietnamese -- have an ineradicable penchant. Though this may not have been in the cards when the visit was first broached by your hosts, as things have worked out, Saigon gets Vice President Agnew but Hanoi gets Henry Kissinger.

6. In addition to wanting to score points on (and nettle) Saigon, Hanoi also wants to show off to (and, perhaps, preen before) Moscow and Peking.

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000800040047-5

SECRET/ []

Indeed, one may legitimately wonder if Hanoi would not like to cultivate a measure of bilateral relations with Washington that could serve as a kind of anchor to windward if relations were to chill between Hanoi and (reciprocally) its two primary communist patrons, particularly Peking. While Hanoi very much wants to project to South Vietnam the suggestion that the latter's fate is being settled by other, more powerful parties behind South Vietnam's back, Hanoi is very sensitive to any atmospheric (let alone substantive) hint that the DRV's fate is being arranged by big powers through relationships in which Hanoi does not directly participate.

5. Finally (though this probably does not exhaust the range of operative motives), Hanoi wants to set a symbolic seal on the Paris agreement -- or at least its interpretation thereof. The DRV's leaders probably attach great importance to the visit -- and will be closely scrutinizing its evolution -- as an omen of US intentions regarding Indochina. The North Vietnamese -- in their propaganda and among themselves -- have consistently pointed to US disengagement from the Indochina struggle as the chief accomplishment of the recently completed negotiations. Just as consistently, however, they have evinced nagging residual doubts about our sincerity on this score. Thus they probably welcome the visit for the reassurance they hope it will connote, but their concerns are not likely to be completely allayed. Indeed, if you take this occasion to remind your hosts that we will not be satisfied with battlefield quiet alone but

really expect all foreign forces -- theirs included -- to be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia, and the Paris agreement's resupply provisions to be strictly adhered to, you will undoubtedly find your hosts' cordiality perceptibly strained.

Best regards,

George